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Or. En. 

On 14 November 1982 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs was 
authorized to draw up an own-initiative report on the European chemical 
industry. 
On 21-22 September 1982 Mr BEAZLEY was appointed as rapporteur. 
On 10 May 1983 the motion for a resolution on the European petrochemical 
industry <Doc. 1-174/82> was referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs as the committee responsible and to the Committee on Social Affairs 
and Employment for its opinion. 
On 21-22 November 1982 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
decided to include the motion within the context of its report on the'chemical 
industry. 
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings on 15 February 
1983, 3-4 November 1983 and 21-22 November 1983. At the latter meeting'it 
decided to change the title of the report from 'the European chemical industry' 
to 'the European petrochemical industry.' 
The committee on Social Affairs and Employment has decided against deliver-
ing an opinion. 
At the same meeting it adopted the report on a unanimous vote. 
Participated in the vote 
Mr MOREAU, chairman; Mr BEAZLEY, rapporteur; Mr BATTERSBY <replacing Mr Ferranti>; 
Mr DELEROZOY; Mrs DESOUCHES; Mr DE GOEDE; Mr HERMAN; Mr KAZAZIS (replacing 
Mr Van Rompuy); Mr LEONARDI; Mr RADOUX (replacing Mr Wagner>; Mr ROGALLA 
(replacing Mr Schinzel>; Mrs THEOBALD-PAOLI; Mr VERGEER. 
The depot was made on 23 November 1983. 
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A 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the European chemical industry 
The European Parliament, 
-having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mrs LIZIN (Doc.1-174/82>, 
- having regard to the report by the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (Doc. 1-1108/83) 
The nature of the European chemical industry 
1. Considers that a healthy and fully competitive chemical industry is 
essential to the economic and industrial structure of the European 
Community. 
2. Acknowledges that the European chemical industry is a large established 
industry trading worldwide with a very extensive range of products, 
being the supplier of basic raw materials and auxiliary products to all 
other industries and to agriculture, whilst offering a wide range of 
pharmaceuticals, agro-chemicals and other consumer products direct to 
the public. 
3. Considers that the European chemical industry is highly dependent for 
its success on an exceptionally heavy investment of money and skilled 
scientists and technicians in research and development into new 
products, processes and markets. 
Notes likewise that the European chemical industry is highly capital 
intensive and product and process and market orientated. 
5 PE 86.449/fin. 
Acknowledges by the nature of the sector in which it operates and by its 
past record in financial matters and labour relations that it has a long-
term interest in its own development through the best use of capital and 
labour. 
4. Recognizes that there is strong competition between the individual Companies 
comprising the European chemical industry within the European Common Market, 
as well as in world markets. 
5. Welcomes the fact that the European chemical industry has over a long period 
been one of the largest, the most stable and the most successful of European 
industries, being highly competitive in world markets. It remains and should 
continue to be a growth industry with a premium of approximately 0.5% above 
the current 2% level of European economic growth. 
Notes that the European chemical industry produces about 41% of the market 
economy countries' consumption of chemicals (USA/Canada 31%, Japan 14%> and 
approximately 60% of world chemical exports (USA/Canada 18%, Japan 5%> and 
consumes approximately 53% of world imports (USA/Canada 9%, Japan 5%>. 
After eliminating Intra-European Community trade from the total, the European 
chemical industry produces approximately 32% of market economy countries' 
chemical exports and consumes approximately 15% of market economy countries' 
chemical imports. 
6. Regrets the effects of unfair State aids, artificial pricing, and other 
distortions occurring in certain Member States to the competitive effect of 
market forces; such forces are essential to bring about the speedy restruc-
turing of certain sectors of the industry, especially the petrochemical 
branch, where the majority of European chemical firms are independent from 
enterprise share holding companies competing in the Community with the 
locally established USA,Japanese and subsidiaries of other foreign chemical 
companies and with direct imports from third countries. 
The petrochemical industry 
7. Notes that the European petrochemical industry was developed during the 
Second World War and in post-war years to manufacture a wide range of heavy 
organic products from oil and gases which were previously based on coal. 
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8. Appreciates that these new feedstocks made possible the production of long 
chain molecular polymers <such as polythene, nylon, polyester, synthetic 
rubbers etc.) and other chemicals <such as synthetic detergents, ammonia, 
methanol etc.> in quantities and at costs which could never be approached 
by traditional processes based on coal. 
9. Recognizes that these technologies for producing petrochemical feedstocks 
were originally developed in the USA by oil companies rather than by the 
traditional organic and inorganic chemical companies whose research in most 
cases developed the new organic end products. 
Notes nevertheless that Europe, despite the disadvantage of not having a 
powerful indigenous oil industry like the USA, quickly developed the new 
technologies taking second place behind the USA and maintaining constantly 
a strong lead over the productions of Japan and the rest of the Free World 
taken together. 
10. Notes that the fast growth of scale of manufacture of petrochemicals between 
1950 and 1973 offset the inflationary tendencies of Western economies with 
continuously lower prices for its products and so enabled high quality poly-
mers to take over large sections of traditional markets previously supplied 
by natural products like metals, wood, woot, cotton, rubber, fats and natural 
oils, etc. 
Likewise notes that the tonnage of inorganics produced from naphtha, fuel 
oil and natural gas feedstock equals that in the organics field, and that 
this therefore accounts for 95% of ammonia production in the OECD countries 
of which some 80% is used in fertilizers. 
Methanol production technology is likewise now based on petrochemical feed-
stocks. Sulphur recovery from natural gas and oil refineries plays an 
important part in sulphuric acid and fertilizer production. 
11. Acknowledges that the onset of the oil crisis in 1973 which created the 
world recession affected particularly severely the petrochemical industry. 
The first and second 'oil shocks' removed from the petrochemical industry 
the possibility to offset inflation by further technical developments and 
scale increase, leaving the industry with some 30% overcapacity which was 
expected to continue for a long period. 
- 7 - PE 86.449/fin. 
12. Appreciates that the high revenues obtained by OPEC countries have enabled 
several to invest in their own petrochemical industry siting it alongside 
their refineries and oil wells and thereby obtaining similar advantages as 
the USA. OPEC producers would otherwise 'flare' the gaseous materials <i.e. 
methane and ethane) as wasteproducts of no value. 
13. Believes that when such developments come on stream progressively from the 
current time, but more significantly from 1985 onwards, the previous domin-
ance of North America, Western Europe and Japan will be weakened. Whilst 
OPEC countries may have high operating costs for their refineries and petro-
chemical plants, they will be able to cost their oil or gas raw material -
which is by far the greatest element of petrochemicals cost - at whatever 
level is necessary. 
14. Considers that whilst much benefit has been obtained from reduction of unecon-
omic petrochemical capacity to date it is essential for Community-based 
chemical and oil companies operating in the petrochemical field to further 
reduce surplus capacity without delay. It is clear that by far the major 
surplus is in ethylene production but that this cannot be tackled on its own. 
15. Whilst appreciating the concern of Member States to avoid further increases 
in unemployment, believes that the maintenance of surplus and uneconomic 
capacity is counter-productive and debilitates both the firms concerned and 
the economics of such Member States. 
16. Believes that the responsibility for the closure of surplus capacity is that 
of the companies involved, who must reorientate the structure of their firms 
as they see fit, giving due consideration to their social responsibilities, 
to their workers and any wider considerations regarding the region in which 
they operate. 
17. Considers that the role of DG III of the Commission should be to maintain a 
watching brief in what is likely to be a major restructuring of the European 
chemical industry. 
Believes that the role of DG IV is an important one insofar as it can facil-
itate the restructuring and rehabilitation of the petrochemicl industry by 
ensuring that State aids are not used to delay or frustrate the operation. 
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Believes further that whilst it is impossible to foresee the exact form in 
which the reconversion and restructuring of the industry will take place, 
it is also necessary to remove excess capacity on a permanent basis. Such 
removal will leave in being a fully viable industry with acceptable levels 
of plant utilization generating satisfactory returns. Believes that it 
should be the concern of DG IV to ensure that in whatever form the production 
reduction takes place, the new structure maintains a fully competitive 
character but that there appears to be no likelihood of this not being the 
case bearing in mind the large number of companies of many different nation-
alities involved. 
The future 
18. Believes that without doubt the chemical industry will continue to play as 
important a role in the European economy as heretofore but that the process 
of adjustment in the petrochemical industry is however likely to have a more 
fundamental effect on the structure of the basic industry. 
Considers that whilst European chemical firms are international in their 
operations they have in the past depended too heavily on a strong national 
home market which, prior to the completion of the Common Market, was 
protected. 
19. Considers that with the European Common Market as the Home Market with no 
internal national barriers and little protection externally, greater need 
arises to increase the specialization of product ranges, so that major 
firms will concentrate their efforts more in sectors where they enjoy par-
ticular strengths. 
Notes that the high cost of research and development in the chemical industry 
will continue to call for large size companies and large-scale production but 
that it is likely that the number operating in a particular sector may be 
reduced. 
Considers however that, as the size and diversity of the chemical business 
in all sectors grows over the next decades, management advantages may be 
found in certain cases by further division of companies rather than greater 
mergers. 
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20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution together with the report 
by the committee to the Council and the Commission. 
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B 
Introduction - Turning Points in the Chellical Imustry 
1. General 
'l'be aost vital - and IIOSt difficult - talent in life is the capability 
to ftCOgDise turning points. '1'h1s is equally true in all walks of life 
and the hiatory of the world 1.8 filled with the stories of those 
prophets who saw the light am were not believed aad those who recognised 
the facts too late and lost the battle. 
The difficulty, of course, Ues in the IIIOWtt of time which is necessary 
to evaluate the available facts ani to assess the reaction of others to 
them. Recognition of significant change cmmot therefore be !Dmediate 
but Wldue delay is both costly and dangerous. 
'1'he chelllical 1rdustry in its long history has passed through several 
distinctive phases when, after long periods of stability it has - either 
of its own initiath!e or through the pressures of the llarlcet or 
legislation - made significant changes to its structure and organisation. 
The present time is such a JllCIIIlent. 
It is unnecessary in such a report to devote too auch time am space 
to the history of the chemical irxtustry. It is well known to all those 
who operate in it but perhaps less well known to politicians, 
administrators and the media- hence the following sWIIIlary. 
2. 19th Century Growth 
Suffice it to say that from v~ry ancient beginnings the chemical 
1rdustry• s scope and structure developed fut with the irxtustrial 
revolution. It was called upon to produoe a variety of known products 
on a mass scale to meet the ever--increasing demarns of a fast growing 
irdustry in the first half of the 19th Century. 
The chemical industry of the 18th Century which developed very fast 
in the 19th Century was an inorganic chemical industry based on minerals. 
In the last quarter of the 19th Century a DW branch of the chemical 
in:!ustry began to emerge based on aore COIIplex technology. This was 
the synthetic organics sector derived froaa the element carbon combined 
with hydrogen am other elements to fom literally m:U.Uons of CCIIIlpounds. 
The fast growth of industry led to a great expansion in world trade. 
Manufactured goods were exported for food and raw materials. In 
consequence the population of Britain and the leading European nations 
g.z:ew very fast as well. People flocked into towns frca the countryside 
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for better jobs and hOusing. The population expansion wu therefore 
an uzban1Md one wh1ch needed ilaportec1 food. The opeDing up of the 
PalllPP in Argentina ern later of the U.S. end Canldian prairies 
supplemented. the wheat which Europe had traditionally 1aported fraa 
RuSsia. Meat Celie f.roll Argentina, Australia aM New Zealand. 
The cheJd.cal ildustry was called upon to Meet greatly ift::reasing 
deaan:ls fraa both industry am agricul tur:e. Up to 1870 the basia of 
the cheDdcal irdustry was the Leblanc p.rooess producing a variety of 
alkalis fr:ca salt, sulphuric ecid ard Uaestone, whilst .z:elated 
products based on sulphuric acid am sodila nitrate provided the 
acids, the chlorine am the nitro-c:aapoums which in:lustry and 
agricul tw:e ~. Synthetic fertilizers were being used to 
supplement natural ones even in the 1840's. The urban population 
needed sodi\D bicarbonate for its bakeries am fizzy drinks. The 
soap, paper, glass and textiles in:1ustr1.es needed alkalis too am 
the cbellical irdustry at that U. was often .referred to u the • alkali 
trade'. 
Frolll these early days up to today the chemical irdustry was a supplier 
of • raw materials• and auxiliary products to all other irdustry 
and to agricul tw:e. Hence tbe swift growth of the iron and steel 
tmustry, of engineering' an::l shipbuilding, of explosives for mining 
an::l of many other sectors, all placed their demards on the chemical 
imustl:y. 
Britain, the leading imustrial power at that time and one of the 
leading producers of chemicals, could supply all its own needs and 
half of its production was exported aainly to the u.s.A. and to the 
Continent. The il¥lustry was located where the r• materials plus 
coal and water supplieG were f.r:eely available especially within close 
range of a port. The companies making t.he11 we.re private firms led by 
an enterprising imividual. 
3. 1870 Turning Point - The Solvays and Alfred Nobel 
However, a tum1nq point came in 1870 when the two Belgians, Ernest 
and Alfred Solvay developed the ePaOnia-soda process successfully 
which could rival am eventually overtake the Leblanc process. This 
process played a aajor part in the structure and nature of the heavy 
chemical in:iustry as it led to the formation of an international group 
of Solvay companies which fraa the start lOOked upon the world as its 
market am mclllaged its affairs accordingly. 
By the end of the 19th Century when the Castner Kellner electrolytic 
process provided caustic soda and cheap chlorine and the catalytic 
contact proces~ ~·coduced very strong and pure sulphuric acid (olewn) 
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for the gxowing organics sector, 110st of tbl basic processes for the 
aaanufac:ture of the major 1norqan1c c:held.cals h&d been established and 
the techDology was widely wnerstood. 
In 1870 aweeping changes were llad.e in the explosives industry whereby 
the 'blac:k powder• of the Middle k}es - a llixture of sulphur, saltpetre 
an:l glycerine was overtaken by the 1nwntion of a swede called Alfz:ed 
Nobel. :rt was he who discovered a safe way of detonating nitroglycerine 
and of aaking it relatively safe to handle by absorbing it in Kieselguhr-
a porous clay. His inwntion of the detonator and dynamite fOUl'ded 
a group of companies in many countries, all locally financed am 
licerr=ed to work his patents. Nobel held shares in these companies but 
did not have control. 
The alkali producers and the explosives manufacturers were 811l0ngst the 
earliest entreprenures to be faced with business problems on a worldwide 
scale. Whilst there was almost certainly no contact between these two 
Groups they came to very similar conclusions about the best way to J:eg\llate 
Ule1r tcar.tes. This incluied market and profit sharing which was 
believed to be necessary to optimise the use of capital in fast expanding 
world markets. SUch arrangements were not illegal at that time in either 
Europe or u.s.A. - the Shennan Anti-Trust Act only being' passed in the 
u.s.A. in 1890. 
Also in 1870 another major change in the chemical industry was taking 
place in the manufacture of dyestuffs. Traditional materials wete 
rapidly being »eplaced by complex organic compounds synthesized from 
derivatives of coal tar. This was an entirely new technology in 
which the Germans soon took the lead from the British an:l French, 
where the earliest significant inventions had been made. 
4. The Gert\\an Organic Chemical Development in D:t,!stuffs and ~ew Products 
The Germans as the Swiss, benefited from the attention paid to 
science - especially chemical science - in their educational system 
an:l also to the close relationship between the German Univeriities 
an:l Ge.rman irdustry. From this developed the chemical iroustry•s 
deperxience on research. :rn the 1870• s this was certainly not the 
case in Great Britain and u.s.A., the world's two leading' irdustrial 
nations. Thus well before the turn of the century the Gemans had 
developed a very large dyestuffs irdustry with a most ·important export 
trade. The Germans did not need to form international groups like 
the explosive and the alkali makers because they became so predominant 
in the dyestuffs, holding some 80% of the world market before 1914. 
- 13 - PE 86.449/fin. 
The German 0011panies, howewr, both within Gel:aaDy and 1n export 
auic:ets, ngulated their affairl in waye which the Geman lw both 
allowed an::l even protected. Units of greater and greater aize wen 
therefon made until finally the greatest combination of all, 
I.G. Fax:hen:S.mustrie, waa formed in 1925, which set 1n train tha 
fO.t111ation of Iaperial Chemical Industries (I.C.I.) in Britain 
a year later. 
However, up to 1914 tbue wexe no turning points. Instead the systems 
of production and trede regulation were developed .aore and more to 
cater for the fast expanding demand. On the fringe of the explooive 
industry in the U.K. there were atteapts to develop artificial silk 
from nitro cellulose after the work done in France on cellulose 
acetate but the main future was to lie with viscose. 
In Germany however, the chemical in:luatry was poised just before the 
First World War for dramatic changes. The great dyestuffs COIIpanies 
secure in their domination of the world's dyestuffs markets and in the 
fields of organic ch.endstry such as drugs and photographic material, 
were ready to exten:! into any branch of the chemical iD::lustry whether 
organic or inorganic. In 1904 mergers between leading German dyestuffs 
producers had formed the irxiustry into two great groups linked with 
each other by agreements to regulate competition. This foreshadowed 
the even greater concentrations of power in the chemical imustry 
which were to follow in Germany, the u.s.A. am the United Kingdom 
during the Great War am afterwards. 
Ge.rman research was looking for new products aimed at opening up vast 
new markets like cellulose fibres, plastics am varnishes, insecticides, 
perfumes and pigments. The first phenol-formaldehyde thermosetting 
plastic resins were produced in 1907 am the first methyl butadiene 
synthetic rubber was in conmercial production in 1912. Synthetic 
ammonia for fertilizers, explosives and chemical uses came into 
production in 1913. 
Sermany was gaining a monopolistic position in the chemical industJ:y 
of the world. The outbreak of War in 1914 marked the next turning point 
which was to cause the most dramatic changes in both the scope am the 
structure of the world's chemical industry. 
5. 1914 Turning Point an:! New Post-war Structures 
The War naturally provided the opportunity in Britain to break 
the international relationships established by the Nobel Trust am 
at the same time to urxiertake a great deal of rationalisation of the 
individu-:11 f'irms producing chemicals or explo•:i.ves. rn Britain also, 
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it gave birth to tha rather unhappy rationalisation of ae.ny 
dyestuffs manufacturers under the British Dyes Ccapany with tha 
largest - Levinsteins - outsicle it. 
~logically gmat stiJiul.us wu given to the search for 
synthetic substitutes for natural products. ::rn particular the 
aanufacture of synthetic e11110n1a, alre.:!y established in~. 
vas important to Britain both froa the point of view of the production 
of ferWizers am in due course, of other applications especially 
the production of coal fraa oU by hydrogenation. 
Finally, the War had an important effect on the structure of the 
chemical irdustry in the world outsicle Germany, replacing the 
specialized international groups like the Solvay Group for alkalis, 
and the Nobel Dynemite Trust for explosives by large nationally 
based Groups with as wide a range of cbellical products as possib].e. 
The firms had to be very large 1n order to be able to raise the 
large capital required to finance extremely expensiva msearch 
and development and the large scale production required by such 
firms. Only very large organisations could raise such huge amounts 
of capital ard justify its employment. Germany had already set the 
pattern for the future in pre-war days and in 1916 by the amalgemation 
of Hoechst-cassella-Ke.lle with Agfa-Bayer-BASF ard two large 
imependent firms in the I .G. der deutschen Teerfarbenfabriken it 
had produced the forerunner for the I.G. Farbenimustrie of 1925. 
u.s.A. am Britain were moving in the sa~~e direction. Dupont 
originally an explosives manufacturer, had expamed greatly during 
the War and another Group, the Allied Cheldcal and Dye Corporation 
was moving towards its fQrmation 1n 1920. 
In Britain the chemical imustry was coalescing aroun:l Nobel 
:ln:lustries, Brunner ~ro., British Dyes (now the British Dyestuffs 
Corporation) arxi the United Alkali Company. These large groupings 
of 19th Century companies were to be consolidated in 1926 into the 
diverse multi-product Group - Imperial Cheld.cal Imustries Ltd. 
The period 1925 saw the consolidation of the new style international 
companies. British companies from the earliest days had seen the 
British Empire as their natural market and whilst Britain ani its 
Dnpire were less protected than u.s.A. and Germany, the demand of 
the British Dominions for competitive supplie-S led at an early 
stage to the establishment of large scale cheDdcal an::l explosive 
manufacture in these territories. The newly established I.C.I. 
maintained its relationship with Dupont 1n the u.s.A. by means of 
Patents and Processes Agreements. This reduced the very heavy 
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cost of research for each fira and aade them 110.re caapetitiw with 
the wry powerful I.G. FarbeDinduatrie. Joint ccapaniea ware al~o 
set up in South America and in Canada. Howe"Ver, the e'Wtr actift 
u.s. Anti Trust Authorities decided during the Second World War 
that such agreements were inl!dm:J ssible and they were COIIlpletely 
disaantled shortly after World war n ended as wem the joint 
c011panies in South Alnerica ard Canada. 
6. 1945 '.rur!!1n9 Point - Anti 'l'rust and Pree Cclllpetition 
In fact 1945 was a aajo.t turning point for the world's chemical 
industry. A clean sweep was made of all the previous agreements 
aa1 the irxlustry entered into fierce competition 1n all world 
markets. The g.reat German Farben.imustrie was split up into its 
three major COIIponent parts - Hoechst, Bayer am BASF. 'l'he enormous 
progress that these firms have made under entiJ:ely independant 
managements despite all the difficulties faced in the early years 
of poa~War Germany are clearly irxlicative of the dynaism which 
can be created by "breaking the mould" - particularly when the size 
of enterprises may become unwieldly. A new dynamic was equally 
instilled in the post-War :JI.c.I. capitalizing on its research and 
development success in plastics ancl fibres in the thirties ancl 
early post-War years am COIIlpeting fist to fist in Europe am in all 
llarkeb throughout the world. The ssae was true of other European 
and u.s. companies. 
However, in this freely competitive world the growth of large State 
run chemical firms which did not necessarily have to face the same 
market discipline as private enterprise COIIIpanies, was an increasingly 
disturbing feature. 
The fast post-war market growth 1n basic heavy chemicals followin:J 
wartime shortages gave a great stimulus initially to the world • s 
chemical irxiustry as it ente.red this new competitive era. 
The late 1950• s and 19601 s brought tremerdous benefit to the chemical 
irdustry when the inventions an:i discoveries especially in plastics 
am fibres based on the newly developect petrochemical industry took 
full advantage of the consumer boola. 
Great advances were made at the same U. in agro-c:hem1cals am 
pharmaceuticals. Many new opportunities -were created for both organic 
am inorganic chemicals but in the late 1960's and early 1970's it was 
specifically with the organic rm~ material products of the petrochemical 
irdustries where the problems -were to arise. 
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7. The 1973 Ene£9Y Crisis - Orisins of the Present Probl• 
Political problems in the Middle East, in Iran, 1a North Africa and 
in other oil producing countries in the 1950's end 1960's had led to 
the nationalisation of aany Western oil fields and refineries. OPEC 
was formed in 1960 and following the 1967 War another petroleua 
exporting organisation, OAPEX:, was for:~~ed. 
Towards the em of the 1960 • s the Bretton-Woods agreement was proving 
illpossible to be maintained. 'l'he different rates of growths of 
inflation of western economies had led to a period of currency floating. 
!he u.s. dollar following the Vietnam War was Ul'lder pressure. The 
December 1969 Smithsonian Conference failed to stabilize Western 
currencies at new levels am on 15th August 1971 President Nixon 
attempted to protect the u.s. Dollar by making it non-convertible 
into gold and the u.s. market by adding 10% to its tariffs. 
Already in 1971/72 the fast &:~vance of the forward prices of Naphtha 
am oil related products foreshadowed the onset of the energy crisis 
in 1973. 
The sudden and continued escalation of the price of oil and oil based 
products at a time when the optimistic forecasts of the petrochemical 
industry were just putting on stream a great nwnber of large new 
plants created the next great turning point, which is the basis of 
the present unresolved crisis in the chemical industry. 
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~ .... · · ·· •· · R.esol ution of the • c:rl..sis • 1n aaln p.rcbl• t£!&1 
8. '1'he Natw:e of the PJ:obl• 
1'he effects of the emergy c:r1sia haft been felt with gmat se-verity 
throughout tba whole of the chell1cal iDdustry. 1'h18 1a the cue 
because the c:beaic:al industry with its ftrY wideapzoeed r~ Of 
products 1a t:be general supplier of r• aateriela aDd auxiliary 
products to all 1Dduatr1ea aDd to agrlc:ultw:e. Hence when all of 
industry is affected by a deep dep.:ession the deaml for a\1 products 
of the c:beld.cal 1Ddustry is eeftnly reduced. 1'he cbe111c:al industry 
1a :furtbemon be.Uy dependant on reaearc:b am capltalinftstJDent. 
Restriction of ita products sales thH'efore has an eftn greater 
effedt on its long ta.r:a prospects ~an for SCIIIe other industries. 
Likewise, the chellical 11¥1ustry 1a one of the major users of energy 
1n ita c:bemlcal processes. Thus the 1nc:reue of acme 19 tilllas 1n 
the price of oU aD:l the caaparable i.ncJ:eases 1n the cost of other 
sow:ces of enHgy spec1f1c:ally to nstrlct desaand has had a 
41s~port1onate effect. Nevertheless it has stillulated a IIUCh 
higher degree of energy saving by redeslgrd.ng processes, cont.J:ol 
systema am fuel sources than 18 apparent 1n many other 1r¥lustries. 
Space does not permit for this report to deal with the natuxe of the 
probleas am the possible solutions 1n each of the vastly diwrse 
branches of the chellical in:iustry. Ita main concern is to consider 
the major p.robleu of the European cheaical industry only, 
concentrating on their solution and the effect which this •ay 
inevitably have on the industry' a futUre structure, profitability, . 
employment prospects an:1 investment needs. 
Of particular 1aportance is the effect of the EurOpean ca.on 
Market on the industry and the part - 1f any - whic:h the European 
Commission might play in its solution. 
The 11ajor European chellical producers have frona certainly the 
beginning of the sec:orxl half of the 19th Century been world tra:iers 
and in many cases international producers. Unlike aany fllropean 
!Mustries theirs is not the problea of adapting a ~ly nationally 
structured industry to a European llal:ket. The c:z:eation of a 
European Coallon MaD:et howewr, with no internal barriers - even no 
internal •technical• barriers to trade - but with exceptionally 
low extemel barriers CCIIpared with tboae behind which its caapetitors 
reside, has not caused a JRajor pr<:lblea even at a time of deep 
recession. It is the lack of uniformity of the COnlllon Malicet• s 
economy between Mellber states which cauaea the aoat aerioua 
distortions. 
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Differences of growth rates, inflation rates, interest rates, 
taxation levels, productivity lewls ere all reflected 1a lkm!llent 
o1 currency parities. Whilst it is tbe habit of the industry to 
base its prices on the Deutschemart, its accounts are atUl prepared 
in National currencies. 
Most serious is the different rate of state intervention of all 
types within the C".081aUDlty. In the extreme case eDOI.'IIOUSly large 
private enterprise OOIIlpanie& facing the ll&rket diac:1pl1nes haft to 
caapete with nationalised cheadcal CCilpaniea wh1c1l receiw YaSt 
state aids. Irrespectift of how this affects profitability, one of 
its. major distorting effects is the protection it giws to out-elated 
!Mustrial structu.t:es, inefficient firms am processes. It is the 
enemy of change and- whatever its benaficient motives - it is a 
prime cause of the continued 118intenaDC8 in production of a high 
percentage of the surplus capacity in the industry. 
The dual tole which the European Coalaunlty has to play is therefore 
aore likely to relate to the activities of D.G.IV- the Competition 
Policy - than to D.G.II or D.G.III. As succeeding sections of 
this report wUl show the most likely area in which solutions to the 
chemical industries• problems wUl be found is between the fiDu 
themselves rather than through COIIIIII.mity Economic or Industrial 
policy. The main motivator wUl be the attrition of profits of 
current structures 8M the attraction of dis-investment in such 
ueas together with re-investment in new structures and new areas. 
Por unaided private enterprise caapanies, however. delayed such 
action has been to date - the rigours of market foroes wlll 
certainly bring it about. The problem lies in the non-exposw:e of 
nationalised am state-aided caapanies. This is where D.G.IV must 
be much more active in applying Articles 92 to 102. 
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9. Petrocbemicals - Fast Post-war Growth followed J?y Collapse 
Tha early dewlopnent of tM organics branch of tile Chaa1cal Industry 
vas based on coal and as previously noted developed first in the 
dyestuffs sector in the last decades of the 19th Century. 'fb1s led to 
the dewlop~~ent of a wide range of synthetic products such as 
pharmaceuticals, themosetting plastics, early f0l:11S of synthetic 
rubber with siaple plastics, artificial fibres and filas beiag llade 
\ 
fro. cellulose. The development of the long chain aolecul.ar polymer 
science was based on the extensive research done in the 1930•s. 
Between 1925 and 1939 I.G. Farben spent just over ~ of its 
turnover on research am development- aon than it distributed in 
dividends. It employed 1,000 qualified R & D personnel and moved 
&head in •any new directions. This was the level which other aajor 
chemical firms had to ~~atch or to approach to participate significantly 
in the "Revolution of Polymer Science". Dupont was the first to 
produce Nylon 66. Its huge costs of R & D into synthetic materials 
can be measured by the fact that it took 8 years and cost us $ 50 million 
to bring nylon 66 into COillllercial production after the first irxlustrial 
sized batch was produced. With similar intensity of R & D effort 
I.c.I. produced the first polythene and the first methylmethacrylete 
resins (Perspex) ani later developed tin polyester fibre and moulding 
resins. Improved new foi11lS of synthetic rubber, of plastic polymers, 
like PVC ancl polystyrene, new synthetic resins am fib.r:es like the 
acrylics, were developed. 
However, it was in the u.s.A. that the introduction of petroleta as a 
raw material for the Chemical Ilx:lustry in the 19201 s first occurred. 
The large quantities of by-product gases fran petrol manufactu.r:e led 
petroleUII and chemical companies to develop processes to up grade these 
gases into valuable chemicals. In the 1930•s conaercial manufac~ 
of organic chenU.cals especially solvents, was established egainst 
identical products made from older raw materials by the established 
chemical aanufactu.r:ers. At the same tiJie natural gas was first used 
as the raw material for the manufacture of aamonia for fertilizers. 
It was to be this route which was to provide the feedstocks for the 
petrochemical in:iustries after the Second World War had given a great 
stimulus to the replacement of many essential rlllll materials such as 
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tu1JMr, fata m1 oils by synthetic organic: products. By 1945 
petroleUII based oxganic cheaicals 1a U.S.A. al.reedy pz:ocluced 
one .Ulion tou of ~al products - four U.s tbe pre-War 
level anct one third of tha total output of organic chellicals. 
The western EUropean dewlop~ent· of petroleulll based c:hu1c:als 
lllthough startecS during the Second World war, rella1nlld 811all 
until 1950. The .reasons for t:b1a we.re to pmve to be sigoificant 
ill the petrocheld.c:al cr1a1s of tbll 1970' • aDd 1980's. UDliJte 
Merica, western Europe had 110at of ita ~:efineri.ea sited close 
to oil fields which it bad developed in the Middle East 81¥1 in 
aany distant places. u.s.A., self sufficient at that ~. in 
oU, hed the stillulus of a most powerful national oU irdustty 
m::l a very large and highly developect unified madcet for petrole1.11 
based chellical prcxtuets. 
The consumer boca of the late 1950's and the 1960's and the early 
1970• s vastly iDc::J:eased the demand for these new prcxlucts. Raw 
uterials producecl by the older techniques had no chance of 
satisfying the deaaD:I nor could it any longer be supplied by 
z:efinery gases am other by-products. The base materials such 
as olefins arx1 aromatics DQI.II hacl to be manufactured on a vast 
scale specially for cheaical uses. So ccae about the very fest 
development of tbe petroleum based chelaical aaDUfactura in western 
Europe with the old established international chemical manufacturers 
using the same petrochemical feedstocks and ~sses in direct 
eo~~petition with the oU caapanies. 'l'hlre GCNl~ be little prcxluct 
diffez:entiation in this petrocbell1.cal and plastic field. The 
oil caapanies were alz:eacly c:o~~peting with the original basic 
chemical producers in agro-chemicals and synthetic detergents. 
However, the area of competition whilst it included the rl!JIW materials 
for fibre production did not reach to the position where the oU 
companies becalll8 fibre manufacturers. 
'1'he dreJQatic growth of the 1950's am 1960's was due to the steep 
J:eduetions in price which it was possible to introduce b-ed on the 
fast developing technology in this area aDd tbe econoaaies of scale 
afforded by the much larger sized plants beinq built. Plutias ard 
synthetic fibres were z:eplacing natural aaterials 11Jce wood, metal, 
glass,ancl natural fibres in moz:e and 110re spheres as prices were 
reduced. The capital intensift nature of this i.Mustry caapared 
with others which were more labour intensive, protected it from the 
inflation of cost~ experienced elsewhere. 
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With such prospects it vas inaviteble that when the oU pr:oclud.ng 
countd.es 1n 1973 iDcJ::eaHCl the price of hydrocarbon feedstocks 
dr811lat1celly, wry substantial new in'vest.nt 1n ad41t1onal capacity 
was com1.ng on stJ:eaa a aany 110at waat on the drwing bou:<ls based on 
the existing market estiaates. Howewr, illprove4 t:ec:bnology could 
110 longer aatc:h the rate of the 1Dcr:euecl price of ~n raw 
•ter:l.els. The pr1ca of the pet:roc:beldcal eld products bM to be 
sharply and xegularly 1ncreaaed with the CODSeqUeDCa thai: aadcet 
growth. was hal ted. 
It was not at first clear that the effect of the OPE Cartel would 
plunge the world's econcay into a lcmg tem stJ:uc:tural crisis. 
Pollow1n; the sharp drop in the western world • s econo.y 1n 1974 
thel'e was a false dam of 1Dduatr1al. ncovwy and 1n peb:ochalt1cals 
output 1n 1975. The medtet remai.Ded flat vhilst new capecity 
authorize<l befoxe 1973 contimJed to cc.a on stn•• With existing 
plant badly umer-utUized, the profitability of the industry 
becsne very low. 
The Iranian crisis of 1978 gave rise to the second oil shock 
incl:easing the price of oil sharply. A secol¥1 false dawn was 
created when fears that feedstocks would become both short in 
supply and therefoR expensive, led to a rapid but temporary 1ncrease 
in petrochemicals deman:ls. 
This was short-lived. A deeper recession than ever developed in 
the Western world and the eoa.mist Bloc wu s1ad.larly eff'-ucted, 
especially as regards the satellite states. OWrall de-stocking 
caused a sharp fall in petrochellicals output in 1980 am despite slow 
growth 1n production in the last quarter of tbat year, by the tb1J:d 
qu£ter of 1981 there were no signs of recovery. 
:tt was thus that the petrochea1.c:al industry like many others had 
failed for nearly ten years to intepret the madcet signs sufficiently 
clearly to talce the necessary actions to safeguard ita capital , ita 
shaJ:ebolders and its WIOJXera. The oU ref1ning 1n:!uatry has been 
left with acme 33f to~ over-capacity with little chance of uWizing 
it untU 1990, whilst the petrocheaical industry has saM 32% of over-
capacity which camot be used untU 1992. No private enterprise firms can 
stand such weakening of their financial structures. The demand for 
solutions 1s therefore pariiiDOWlt. 
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10. '1'he Buildil!q of Petrocbead.cals Plenta in OPJX: Countries 
'1'he exceptionally high re¥enuea obta1nect by oU State• between 
1973 and today have caused them to seaa:ch for auital:»le 1nveablanta 
which wUl develop their countries uaeta, incz:e.,. their nwnue, 
earn foreign currencies and create a tra1necl t:ec:hn1ca1 c.s.re _,ngst 
their WOJ:k people. The Chellical Irduatry aD4 part1c:ularly the 
petrochea1c:a1 branch of it was the obvioua one to put alcmgs1cle 
their surplus supplies of oU am gas. 
The Soviet UDion had taken sildlar decisions •aD¥ years earlier. 
'1"he combined thr:eat of these two 110st iaportant oU and gas producers 
to create a petrochelll1cal in:iustry alongside their oil and gas wells 
clearly calls for careful ~nsideration by Europema aD4 even by 
u.s. am Canadian producers of the extent to which the structure 
of the petrocbellical in:!ustry will thereby be changed. 
So long as the oil and gas feedstock and energy costs to the local 
OPEX: producer can represent only 60% to 70% of the cost of production 
in traditional producing nations, the entry of the •conventional-energy-
rich-nations• (CERN's) previously not involwd in the petroc:bellical 
business, into production and sale of such products on world markets 
must have a significant effect. 
'l'heir raw material cost advantages llUSt outweigh any other considera-
tions. 'fbe technology is freely available fro. a great number of 
specialist construction caapanies licence<l by oU or chemical firms, 
CSRN'' • can easily attract tec:hn1c:al and llal:keting management from the 
pet.roeheJiic:al c:oaapazd.es of the free world which has auffe.recS fraa the 
energy crisis. Technicians at all levels are equally available.se is 
the labour to build the plants from many parts of the Middle East, 
Inclian Continent or further afield. Many oU and chemical companies 
from u.s.A., Western EUrope and Japan haw sold their technology and 
1n certain cases they haw set up joint c:aapanies to enable thell to 
obtain petrochald.cal products at cheap prices froaa the 110at IIOCiern 
large scale plants being installed 1n CERN's and thereby to be able 
to close saae of their own less efficient older plants. Meanwhile 
they can thereby contain the total volume of petrocheaical products 
on world aarkets • 
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!fhe size of the price advantage on feedstodts a"YaUabl.e 1a Saudi-
Arabia for u:.-ple, was illustrated by the u.s. Departaant of 
state when it sbo.--ed that Petro&ai.n, a local supplier of natural 
gas, charge 50 centa per .Ulion British thenaal units ~ 
with the ngul.atad price of gas 1n the u.s.A. of 1 •· When u.s. 
gu is de-ngulated the advantage will be even greater. 
A aajor pa:oblea is the large DUIIber of tba CERN's wbo haft 
nrlually DO loc:al llat'ltet for petr:ocbell1c:al products and who w111 
Mll U IIUch all m of their production Oft world aarketa U r• 
aaterial.a, 1nt.exmediary or Hlli-fiDisbed products. 'l'be price 
advantage is particularly significant 1n certain pr1maxy 
petroc:beld.cala like 811110n1a, methanol am ethylene. Pull details 
of caaparat1w figures for Ethane, Naphtha, Methane and Ethylene, 
Methanol and Allllonia, am shown on pages 26 to 31 of the u.s. 
International 'l'rede Comaission • s report on "The Probable Dlpact 
on the u.s. Pettochemical Ird.ust:ry of Expanding Petroc:hea1cal 
Irdustri.es 1n Conventional Energy Rich Nations". 
Already the EUropean fertilizer in:iustry is suffering from the 
import of cheaply priced ammonia based n1trogeneous fertilizers 
fr011 ThUd World countries ard of course ethylene is the 
petrocha1cal product which is at the root of all the major 
surpluses 1n EUrope. 
The main conclusions of the u.s. International Trade Coaniasion•s 
report are:-
(a) The treditional petrochem1cal producing areas of the 
world 1nclud1ng the u.s.A., Western &.~rope and Japan, 
are expected to haw a lower future share of the world • s 
production capacity for certain building block petrochemicals 
and as a result could have a lower future share of the 
world's net exports of these petrochemicals end 
derivitives. 
The figures es percentages of capacity as CERN's capacity 
comes on streem is es follows:-
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Ate a Ethyleae AalloDla Methanol 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
u.s.A. 35 29 18 u 25 19 
Western D.uope 33 27 16 12 26 19 
Japan 12 10 3 2 
' 
6 
Totals 80 66 37 27 60 44 
.U: regards net world exports over the sSDe period a-
Ethylene u.s. aows frca 45% in 1980 to being a 
net iaporter in 1990 
APIIIOnia 
Methanol 
Western Europe aoYes from 2~ to 25% 
Solie incli vidual countries however 
become net importers. 
Japan from 10% to 1.% 
Total 71% to 25% 
u.s.A. 8% 1n 1980 to net importer in 1990 
Western Europe from 20% to less than 0.5% 
Japan remains a net importer 
Total11K>ves fraa 25% to Nn. 
u.s.A. 4% in 1980 to ~ 1n 1990 
western Qlrope 11% in 1980 to less than 0~5% 
Japan net iaported both years 
Total 15% in 1980 to 2% in 1990 
(b.) 'l'he CERN countries aost likely to develop world scale petr:o-
chemical plants in 1990 are Saudi-Arabia, Irdonesia, Kuwait, 
Canada, Mexico, u.s.s.R. an:i China. 
Between theal these countries own 55.~ of Crude Petrole'Wil 
Resenes, (Saudi-Arabia 24.~, Kuwait 9.6%, u.s.s.R. 9.4%, 
Mexico 7 .2%) end 53.6% of natural gas reserves (U.s.s.R. 41.0%, 
Saudi-Arabia 3.9%, Canada 3.~, Mexico 2.5%). 
Cc > The CERN's u:e expected to have feedstocks an:! energy cost 
aivantages through the use of previously flared natural gas. 
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(d~ Canada, MIIXico, u.s.s.R., am ChJ.Da are expected to haw a higher 
future shaN of world petrocbaical production for tbe aajor 
building block petroc:bell1cals and therefore a higher Det 
share of the world • a petroc::bea1c:als exports. 
Pigs. 1D I of world c :t1oncaJ)aC1ty 
Bthylene -.onia Methanol 
World 
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
Canada 3 
' 
2 3 3 7 
Max1c:o 1 2 2 4 1 4 
u.s.s.R. 5 7 22 28 15 17 
CbiDa 1 3 12 10 2 2 
+ Saudi-Arabif\ 
Indonesia aDd 1 4 2 3 3 6 
Kuwait 
'l'O'rAL 11 22 40 48 24 36 
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C•> Worl4 tr.te~~m et:byleDe ~its derl:ri.tifta 1a expected to 
~ ao:1 increuJ.Dgly irwolw exports frca the aew 
pet:mc:bead.cal ~ natioM to other Dat1Das part.lcularly 
the traditional petrochell1cal clewloped ones. 
Net Trade Balances for 1980 aDd 1990 for ethylene 1D tems 
of ethylene equivalents (ill thousalds of •tric tons) 
Area 1980 1990 
- - -United States 1,380 -1,280 
Canada 215 -1,815 
Mexico -264 185 
other Western Headsphere -320 -640 
Western Europe 800 1,480 
Japan 275 -352 
Middle East 375 1,245 
Africa -195 365 
Asia -905 -2,825 
u.s.s.R. -100 375 
China -120 -515 
Eastern Europe -75 -805 
The table in:licates that the United States and Japan could 
becaae net importers of ethylene and its derivatives by 
1990 although they were net exporters in 1980. They could 
be joined by many nations in Western Europe as petrochemical 
imustry rationalization takes place, even though Western 
&.trope is currently a net exporter. Nations in the Middle 
East and Africa am probably Mexico 8l'ld Canada would be the 
sources of most of the i.Jiports. However, Caneda'a national 
feedstock and energy pricing policies may li.llit future 
exports, and exports from Mexico may be liJUted if internal 
potential markets develop sufficiently fast to absorb futunt 
production. 
Ethylene production capacity located in seven leading CERN's 
could approximately double between 1980 and 1990. 
(f) Ammonia and its derivatives are expected to continue to be 
widely traded, and net exports from the U.s.s.R., Mexico, 
Tr1n1clad, and the Middle East to the United states, Western 
Europe, and Japan could inct:ease. 
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'!he followiDg table U.ata net trade baleaces (in tbousarlds 
of ~~etric tons> for 1980 a 1990 for D1trogen. 
Area 1980 1990 
- --
united States 675 -3,670 
Canada 875 2,080 
Mexico 450 2,540 
'l'r1n1dad 460 985 
Other western Heaisphere 180 180 
western EurOpe 1,725 25 
Japan -230 - 685 
M1ddle East 910 1,180 
Africa -1,275 -2,080 
Asia -1,860 2,450 
u.s.s.a. 2,820 9,275 
China -1,635 -1,730 
Eastern Europe 455 1.85 
The table indicates that the United States am saae Western 
European nations could become net importers of nitrogen 1n 
1990 although they were net exporters in 1980. They could 
receive exports from many other nations, all of which have 
plans to enlarge current capacities to produce .-onia am 
its derivatives. Large capacity additions ~ expected in 
Canada, Mexico, Trinidad, the Middle East, Asia, am the 
u.s.s.R. 
Future supply demand scenarios that do not 1ndicate a 
potential world nitrogen surplus az:e difficult to construct. 
A balanced scenario can be constructed only if future 
production CaPacity 1a decr:eased by certain planned facUities 
not being built ~/or certain current operating production 
capacity beinq closed, ard/or future consumption growth 
rates being above those expected by most observers. 
Anmonia and its derivatiws have been emphasized 1n the 
petrochemical industry developnent plans of ID08t CERN's. 
Operating production capacity has already been closed in the 
united States; 36 aamonia plants were reportedly closed 
during the period from 1977-82. l:n:lustry sources see the 
potential for this trem to continue as new overseas facilities 
come on streaa and natural gas prices are decontrolled in the 
United States. 
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(g) The extent of future world trade 1D methanol could 
depel¥1 on whether ~~ethanol :beco.ea a aajor energy aourc:e. 
The following table lists net trade balances for 1980 
and the 1990 base scenario for ~~ethanol (in thousands of 
metric tons) • 
Area 1980 1990 
- - -United states 40 120 
Canada 210 1,485 
Mexico so 875 
other Western Hemisphere -40 615 
Western aarope 125 0 
Japan -100 -250 
Middle East 150 1,025 
Africa 150 670 
Asia -so 400 
u.s.s.R. 200 2,000 
China -40 0 
Eastern Europe 200 800 
Methanol has traditionally been used as a solvent am as 
a feedstock for the manufacture of other chemicals. 
However, while these markets are expected to continue to 
incmase, it is the fuel market that offers the greatest 
future potential. 
The base scenario data above for 1990 do not include any 
appreciable use of methanol as a fuel. 
A more stable world marlcet based on the expanded use of 
methanol as a fuel would be liad.ted to its use in low-level 
petrol blerxls and as a feedstock for the manufl;lcture of 
petrol additives capable of increasing the octane level 
of the petrol to which they are added. 
Widespread use of methanol as a direct fuel and/or a 
feedstock for the manufacture of petrol would necessitate 
additional world methanol capacity. It is probable that 
umer such a scenario a large part of the additional 
methanol production would be based on coal 
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11. Solutions to the &u:oP'an Petrochellicol Problem 8DIS Their E:ffec:" 
on the st.ruc:tUA of the Cheadcal Inr1uatry 
The petrochemical prcbl• is a worldwide one and is oot just xestricted 
to EurOpe. This is because of the international character of the 
Chemical Industry em the extent to which exports play a v.:ltal part 
in the profitability of its investments. 
The u.s. !Mustry considers that no one action or COIIIbination of 
actions can provide a remedy for present or possible tutw:e problems. 
This is equally true of the &Jropean situation or the Japanese position. 
Purthe.t1DOre, thez:e is no question of the industry being organised even in 
Europe let alone in global terms to a single solution by a single body. 
Each individual Company in the end will have to make its own decisions 
taking into account its expertise and assets in each department whether 
it be in natural resources, R & D, Production or Marketing, or any 
c:oqlbination of these factors. In this latter regaxd pet.rochemic:als 
Companies belonging to oil companies may well z:eac:t differently fraa 
the traditional chemical companies which have a much wider product 
line. The I.c.I./B.P. deal is a perfect example of this in which the 
combination of petrochemical manufacture with its chlorine manufacture 
JM~ces it natural for I.c.I. to specialize in PVC an:l the lack of a 
chlorine base in B.P. for that firm to specialize in ethylene 
derivitives like polythene. 
Similarly certain European canpanies, for example Bayer an:l the Swiss 
industry, have restricted their interest in petrochemicals basicly to 
the extent to which its products can be used internally for a wide 
range of highly specialized products which are much less affected -
if at all - by the pressure on selling "CODIIOdity" products. 
On the other hand whereas Dupont have bought the oil company "Conoco" 
to join a traditional chemical company to an oil company, some other 
u.s. oil based firms are aban:loning the production of plastics and 
high \fOlume primary petrochemicals. Other U.S. firms are planning to 
close their u.s. petrochemical facilities and to import their require-
ments from joint companies which they have aade with CERN's (Conventional 
Energy Rich Nations) 1n cr~erseas countries which have access to cheap 
feedstock and cheap enerqy prices. Such u.s. firms are joinad in their 
approach to the problem by Japanese finns both of which groups see in 
such joint ventures improved profits by matching the cheap rlllt 
aa.terial arxl energy costs of the one party with the high level 
technical arxl marketing skills of the other. Furthe.t1DON, in such 
deals the experienced technical aoo marketing fim c.an take from the 
cheap raw material producer the petrochellical product at whate'V".:'·" 
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stage is jointly decided, upgradi.Dg it epPJ:Opriately if aecessary 
in the advanced C<Dpany•s factories in u.s.A. or Japan. 
Large scale an1 long term projects such as Dr. AJ:m1n H.aer• s 
Occidental Petroleua Company's Ul-fated deal with U.s.s.R. 
exchanging phosphoric acid fraa his u.s. plants for the export 
fraa U.s.s.R. of the aJIIIOnia frca the Soviet plants newly built 
with western technology, is another way of illlproving coapetitivity. 
'l'he closure of oub-datecl u.s. elllllOnia plants naturally is the 
c:onsequence of such a deal. 
Saudi-Arabia 1s a leading exponent of the joint company approach. 
:It has set up special machinery to carry it out 1n the fornt of 
the Saudi-Arabian Basic J:mustries Co-operation (SABJ:C) and the 
Saudi J:mustriel Development Fund (SJ:D!'). other OPa= CERN's have 
sim1lar organisations. Partners haw been found predCIIinantly in 
u.s.A., Japan, an1 'l'aiwan. 
It is natural for other companies to turn to gmater specialization 
as a way of improving their position. This is not an easy choioe for 
traditional marwfac::turers with a wider range of basic chenlical processes 
and products. At the exaeme point "fine chemicals" is a highly 
specialized business demanding a very different form of management 
and marketing than the "coumodi. ty" business. 
SOlie traditional basic firms may decide to withdraw totally fr011 
petrochemicals, leaving this to the oil COIIpanies and more heavily 
committed petrochemical firms. 
C:C.panies within the chemical industry have always been willing to 
accept suitable divisions 1n the fields 1n which they operate, 
according to the nature of their special skills 1n processes and 
products. Some therefore could improve their prospects by certain 
liaitations of their ranges aD1 increased purchasing from others. 
A further type of solution to the problem is for some companies who ate 
exceptionally strong 1n certain Research and Developaent fields to 
exploit completely new proc:essin; techniques like fermentation 
processes and biotechnology, etc. 
Whilst 1n countries dOIIinated by private enterprise companies the 
nature of cotapetitiori is between individual companies, in those dominated 
by State Monopolies it is between countries. This is a particular 
the 
danger 1n;petrochem1cal 1ndustry where the raw material cost is such a 
high proportion of the final price of a product. 
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HoNeve.r the state can intervene in •any less obvious 8DII mre 
subtle ways, by price controls on raw aate.rials or energy, in parb-
restricti.Dn., state aids, local content legislation, export a:edits 
and trade aaechanisms generally. 
The Japanese imustry indicates a particular way in which States can 
intervene for their own benefit but which causes clisto.rtion of the 
world aaarlcet. '1'be Japanese petrochellical indusb:y 1a losing ita 
COIIpetitivity because it 1a based on either illported aaphtha feedstocks 
or made fraa 1mportAiKl petroleum. In the past the Government had permitted 
only the petrolewn industry to import crude oil or petroleua based 
products such as naphtha. A domestic naphtha price above world level was 
maintained by lat. In 1982 MITI - a governaent agency ... laid down guide 
lines to change this. Petrochemical caapanies may now freely import 
and beginning in 1984 import duties on naphtha will be .r:emovec.t. 
KITl: also established at the end of 1982 "scrap ratios" for existing 
plants for ethylene am many other petrochemicals to facilitate their 
closure and removal. Production cartels were established for limited 
periOds - 6 months from October 1982 to March 1983 for ethylene for 
exa~~ple. Japanese cartels have previously existed for PVC and LOw 
Density polythene, to control capacity utilisation am to pz:event 
over-proJuction. 
The EUropean ConlllUnity chem1cal imustry faces a unique problem. It 
manufacturers and trades within a home market coaposed of 10 nations 
living within a single tariff barrier but whose political, legislative, 
fiscal, econonai.c and labour systems all differ. The effect of this on 
currency parity values and on .rates of g.a:owth, inflation, and on 
interest rates has a wry considerable effect on the basic costs of 
manufacturing products in different Member States. To overcome the 
problem of each Member State having a different currency, the chemical 
indus try sells its goOds within the EO: normally in DeutschaMatic or in 
local currencies f~ to the DM. Whilst this helpa to provide scme 
market uniformity of price it sWl leaves costs on a varying basis. 
Of 110re direct mncern to the Dl.ropean chellical indusb:y in solving its 
petrochemical problems and umertaking any other form of necessary 
restructuring, is the different attitudes of Meaber states• Governments 
to Industrial Policy. In France the heavy chellical imustry is dominated 
by state Corporations and in 1982 several major caapanies wez:e 
nationalized. The intention of the Governnent was stated to be the 
improvement of the ccnpetitiveness of the French chelldcal industry. 
The nationalized companies have been divided into three groups each 
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of which 1s expected to ccmcentrate on illprovements within their 
autually exclusi'ftt and m:bitrarily definecl product sectors. 
Their Chief Executives consider that they have been given a free 
hand to take what steps they believe to be necessary to achieve their 
objectives. The test will come when the needs of a product group 
delaands the closw::e of a factory in a J:egion where there aay already 
be very high employment in, for exa~ple, the ~~lining or t.extil.e 
iDiustry. 
-.rhe J:talian Govel:'rlment now controls a wry large part of that 
country• s chemical imustry. :rn the past its actions in supporting 
the building of enormous synthetic fibres plants in specially aided 
areas when the synthetic fibres business within the CommUnity and 
throughout the world was already in great difficulties so that the 
aajor companies in other Member States were closing many of their 
plants, naturally giwsrise to concern in regard to the problems of 
the petrochemical imustry. 
The Italian Government• s present action in rationalizing their 
chemical irdustry by plant transfer between two major companies, is 
intended to eliminate the duplication of production facilities and 
excessive competitive marketing. The scope of the Italian Government's 
action reaches from primary and secon:lary chemical products to include 
speciality and fine chemicals. To this extent the objective may be 
a worthy one which private enterprise might succeed in attaining to 
a lesser extent by its own efforts. The fear - particularly within 
a Common Market - is the extent to which the Italian Government may 
be willing to further its plans to facilitate the success of the 
rationalization an:l to improve that imustry• s competitivity in the 
EEX:: and world markets by the continued grant of State aids. 
These two excaples which could be enlarged upon by the differences existing 
in other l-1ember States, indicate that any fo.tm of direct European 
Community action would be most difficult to conceive ani even more 
difficult to apply successfully. Hence the most suitable direct 
action would seem to lie with the chemical manufacturers themselves. 
An objection to the part played by the ntropean Coani.ssion in the 
case of the EEX:: synthetic fibres crisis has been that its well meant 
actions in fact protected the industry from the national attrition 
which market forces would have exerted on Companies• balance sheets 
and which would thus have forced a more complete and quiclcer solution 
to the problem. 
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'!he Datw:e of the political probl• 1a well understood, especially 
u it affects eaploy.ent 1n particular regions of tba Cawud.ty. 
However the size and diversity of cheJI1cal. caapanies alz:eldy builds 
1n a factor which enables thell to continue 1n bad conditiona which 
would destroy soaae other industries and may be longer than 1s 
economically desirable. 'rhe tradition of the chemical industry 
for having llai.ntained excellent labour relations with ita workers 
giws confidence that it can achieve aajor changes of this type with 
the minima of hardship. 
There therefore appears to be no case for D .G.III to be invol w<l 
in • crisis cartels • or C01111lUl'li ty schemes of imposed rationalization. 
There is however a most important role for D.G.IV to play 1n regatd 
to the Colllmmity' s CompetitioD PolJ.cy. 
Firstly the full use of its extensive powers 1n regard to the use of 
state aids by Member states must be employed. If not, the aize and 
the nature of the distortions could delay the whole resolution of 
the iooustry' s difficulties. It could expose the industry to a loBJ 
period of costly utilisation of excess capacity, debilitating it 
against the natural advantages enjoyed by many CERN's. ~se nations 
wUl take a natural place in the market in any case, either on their 
own account or even worse in combination with Europe's American and 
Japanese competitors. 
Secoooly, o.G.IV must be satisfied that any restructuring of the 
trade meets the requirements of the Competition Policy in .i:egard to 
concentrations and mergers and to dominant positions. In principle 
there should :?e no danger of this and it is in the positive rather 
than the negative sense that the proposition is made. National 
Competition Authorities give their approval to such rearrangements 
between companies, certainly those established in a single Member 
State. Mergers between companies established in different Member 
States is stUl a very difficult proposition because of the 
different management and legislative traditions involved and because 
of the inherent size problem. 
Secrecy is naturally a vital element of such restructuring arrangements 
because of stock exchange values, etc. Delay can therefore be 
dangerous and may destroy a very necessary change. A means therefore 
of handling this problem and its dissemination to interested parties 
is most important. 
Finally, D.G.IV - as D.G.III - must consider the problem in its 
international context as well as in its purely European one. 
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Numerous proposals exist within the &lrOpean chemical induatJ:y itself 
such as the Gatti/Grenier proposals of the trade, am tha Solvay/Mallat 
iniividual proposals. It is not the purpose of the writer to conaent 
on them, other than to say that they are worthy atteapts of a complex 
European Chemical trade to identify am analyise its problems in 
considerable detail and to find ways of sol v1ng them. It is lllUCh 
to be cxaplimented that the t.ra:le am the Conlllission has entered 
into such ccaplete confidential discussions one with another. One 
danger of the proposals may be that they may apply a lowest 
denominator factor which exacerbates the problem more than is 
desirable. They lllay call for a degree of unanimity which is greater 
than may in the event be attainable and the doubt will always exist 
in such wide proposals that a plant which it has been ag.z:eed should 
be closed has really been xemoved am not just put into mothballs. 
On the other hand the number of I.C.I./B.P. deals which can be 
arranged may not be enough or may not take place quickly emugh to 
avoid unnecessary further suffering but it must be expected that the 
aanagements of both Public and Nationalized Chemical Companies will 
respord to their belance sheet responsibilities. 
Finally, this is a major turning point in the chemical industries• 
history - both for the European as for all the chemical companies 
of all other nations. A new structure DIUSt be fown which can be 
approved by the companies themselves, which gets the blessing of the 
! European Commission and the National Competition Authorities ani 
minimises the hardship to employees at ell levels. It aust be a 
EUropean rather than a National reconstruction but it must be 
achieved in the international context into which it has to fit. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
DOCUMENT 1-174/82 
tabled by Mrs LIZIN 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the situation in the European petrochemicals industry 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX 
- having regard to the disastrous turn of events in the European petrochemicals 
industry, 
- aware of the risks facing the weakest in a division of the markets between 
producers outside European control, 
1. Believes that specific action must be taken promptly, on the basis of a 
report by the European Parliament; 
2. Calls upon the C~mmission to initiate without delay high-level consultations 
with representatives of the workers in the industry; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the appropriate 
authorities. 
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